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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the linkages between international trade, environmental degradation and 
economic growth in a dynamic North-South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function 
subject to an endogenously improving technology, the North produces manufactured goods by 
employing labor, capital and a natural resource that it imports from the South. The South extracts the 
resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies 
in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non-
cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non-cooperative trade is inefficient due to externalities. 
Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit the North. Both regions gain from 
improved productivity in the North and faster knowledge diffusion to the South regardless of the 
trading regime.   
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1. Introduction 
Natural resources are an important component of world trade.  To many less developed 
countries they are a critical source of foreign exchange, while to many developed economies they are 
indispensable factors of production.  As a consequence of this asymmetric relationship that exists in 
the world economy, natural resource policy inevitably involves strategic aspects that can be 
conveniently analyzed as a dynamic game between the industrial North and the less developed 
South.  The key elements of this game are that the natural resource is supplied by the South using 
labor of which it has a surplus endowment.  North requires the natural resource as an essential input 
for its industrial output, part of which it trades to the South for consumption purposes, in return for 
the natural resource. 
One of the important aspects of the world trading relationship that we envision is that the 
decisions of both regions potentially involve externalities that they are likely to impose.  First, the 
extraction of the resource is likely to cause significant environment damage that may long persist, or 
that may even be irreversible.  In this regard, in making its production decisions and thereby 
generating its demand for the natural resource, the North is likely to cause pollution in the South, a 
fact that it ignores in making its production decisions.  For its part, the South, being the sole supplier 
of the natural resource, has monopoly power, that it finds optimal to exploit in setting the price at 
which it is willing to trade with the North.  By ignoring these spillover effects, the time paths 
generated by non-cooperative behavior are likely to be dynamically inefficient. 
The relationship between trade policy, economic growth, and the environment has evolved 
into a long literature, exploring many issues.  Using a differential game framework, Galor (1986), 
focuses on the slower growth rate that results when North and South trade non-cooperatively. 
Chichilnisky (1993,1994) emphasize ill-defined property rights over South’s resources which gives 
rise to overexploitation of South’s environment. A resource monopoly is desirable as it would curb 
pollution but, it is also inefficient as it will hamper economic growth. Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) draw attention to the beneficial effects of trade on research and development and capital   2
accumulation. Alemdar and Ozyildirim (1998, 2002) note that the unwanted effect of a resource 
monopoly is mitigated when trade is accompanied by knowledge spillovers to the South.
1  
Also, a large number of studies inquire the feasibility of sustained economic growth when 
environment acts as a natural constraint (e.g., Gradus and Smulders, 1993; Bovenberg and Smulders, 
1995, 1996; Musu, 1996, Eliasson and Turnovsky, 2004). These studies, however, either ignore trade 
relationships between regions or assume that they are identical, (e.g., Hettich, 2000).  
In this study, we focus on the strategic aspects of trade in natural resources by extending the 
standard dynamic North-South model to one in which production in the North takes place in two 
sectors.  Final output, which requires the use of the natural resource as an essential input, also uses 
labor, physical capital, and knowledge (technology), as productive inputs.  Knowledge, which is 
produced in a second sector, does not require the natural resource as a productive input.  Both 
productive sectors are general with respect to their respective returns to scale, and indeed, the 
productive side of the North economy is characteristic of the recent non-scale growth models, 
pioneered by Jones (1995) and further developed by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).  An important 
feature of our analysis is that as knowledge accumulates in the North, it facilitates the abatement of 
pollution in the South and to capture this critical role satisfactorily is the reason for the 
disaggregation of North’s production. 
Our analysis proceeds in two stages.  First, we set out the formal analytical solution and 
characterize the equilibrium dynamics. Then, the dynamic responses to various structural changes 
are analyzed and compared with the efficient paths. Specifically, we consider (i) a thirty percent 
increase of productivity in the final output sector; (ii) a thirty percent increase of productivity in the 
knowledge producing sector; (iii) a tripling in the applicability of knowledge to pollution reduction 
in the South and (iv) a doubling in the environmental damage rate of the natural resource.  
                                                 
1 Earlier studies analyzing resource policy in a strategic framework include Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Dasgupta 
(1982).  A large number of studies use dynamic game theory to focus on various aspects of environmental issues such as 
joint exploitation of natural resources (Benhabib and Radner, 1992; Sorger, 1998) and transboundary pollution (Dockner 
and Long, 1993; Chander and Tulkens, 1992; van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992 and 1994; Benchekroun and Long, 
1998; Hoel, 1997). 
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Due to the inefficiencies that accompany the non-cooperative mode of trade, global welfare 
is substantially lower under non-cooperation than it is under cooperation. Also noteworthy is the fact 
that a regime switch from a cooperative to a non-cooperative trade regime, while always reducing 
South’s welfare, increases North’s welfare.  Consequently, not only is North unwilling to cooperate, 
but also the inefficiencies that arise from such a reluctance is severe. South sets the resource price to 
internalize the local cost of pollution as well as to extract monopoly rent from North. From a global 
perspective, to the extent that North also cares about South’s environment, resource prices would be 
inefficiently low because they would reflect only the local cost of pollution.  But then, this would be 
partly alleviated thanks to the exercise of monopoly power by the South. Thus, to the extent that 
North cares about South’s environment, South’s monopoly is not that bad after all.  
North, on the other hand, decides on a resource allocation so as to maximize its own welfare. 
Resources allocated to the production of final goods yield immediate higher consumption while 
resources that are employed in the technology sector will yield higher consumption only in the 
future.  Given that delaying consumption is costly, that resources that pollute South are employed 
only in the final goods production, and that neither region internalizes the knowledge spillover, all 
lead to an inefficiently small knowledge sector from a global perspective. As a result, an excess 
production of final goods cause an over accumulation of physical capital and an over use of 
resources, the latter ultimately leading to an excessive level of pollution in the South.   
Indeed, the same results are replicated under various parameter configurations attesting to the 
fact that knowledge spillovers can be a significant source of distortions in global growth. Further, 
although the pollution we consider is local in nature, nonetheless, it has global ramifications for 
growth when coupled with knowledge spillovers.  All else being the same, an increased rate of 
knowledge diffusion in the South makes resource extraction less costly, leading to lower prices and 
thus faster accumulation of both physical capital and knowledge in the North.  Conversely, North’s 
growth can be checked if resource extraction creates more damage to South’s environment.  Trade 
between the regions acts as a conduit for the local changes to be transmitted to the other side. 
The balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Analytical solutions and 
equilibrium dynamics are studied in Section 3. Numerical simulations of the dynamic responses to   4
various structural changes are discussed and compared with the efficient paths in Section 4. Section 
5 concludes, while technical details of the numerical methods employed are summarized in the 
Appendix. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Non-Cooperative North/South Trade 
The global economy comprises two regions, North and South.  Each region is populated with 
infinitely-lived identical individuals,  N L  in North and  S L  in South, which grow at the exogenous 
rates,  NN N LL n =   and  SS S LL n =  , respectively.  Since our main interest lies in the analysis of how 
various sources of inefficiencies interact to distort growth trajectories in an aggregative dynamic 
game framework, we adopt the social planning paradigm. 
The North produces a final good, Y, that can be either consumed, invested, or exported to the 
South at a fixed price of unity. Manufactured goods are produced using labor, capital, technology 
(knowledge), A, and a raw material (resource), R, in accordance with a Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
    [ ] [ ]
LK AR
YN YA u Lv K R
αα α α φ =        ( 1 )  
where  Y φ  is an exogenous technological shift parameter, 0 1 i α < < , (i  =  A,  L,  K,  R) are the 
productive elasticities, u and v are the respective fractions of labor and capital employed in the final 
good sector.  Raw material is imported from the South. 
New knowledge is produced in the technology sector by employing labor and capital, 
together with the existing technology.  The new technologies accumulate at a rate, J, while the stock 
of existing knowledge depreciates at a constant rate,  A δ . Thus the state of technology evolves 
according to: 
[ ] [ ] (1 ) (1 )
LK A
AN A A AA u L v K A JA
ββ β φ δδ =− − − ≡ −      ( 2 a )  
where  A φ  denotes an exogenous technological shift factor and 0 1 i β < < , (i = A, L, K) are the 
productive elasticities.     5
Equilibrium in North’s final good sector is described by: 
    NS K KYC C K δ =− − −         ( 2 b )  
This equation asserts that North’s final output is either consumed in the North,  N C , exported to the 
South,  S C , allocated to replace depreciated capital,  KK δ , or accumulated as new capital, K  .  South 
finances its purchase of consumption imports by the export of raw materials, which it sells at the 
relative price p, (South’s terms of trade) over which it has a monopoly price.  We assume that trade 
between the two regions is balanced, so that 
     S Cp R =         ( 3 )  
implying 
    NK KYC p R K δ =− − −         ( 2 b ’ )  
Equation (2b’) indicates that by controlling its terms of trade, South can indirectly influence the pace 
of physical capital accumulation in the North. 
North’s planner takes the South’s terms of trade as given and is assumed to maximize the 
intertemporal utility of the representative agent, namely, 
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⎝⎠ ∫    (4) 
subject to the production and the accumulation constraints (1), (2a), (2b’),  0 (0) KK = ,  0 (0) AA = , 
and 0 N C ≥ .   NN CL  is per capita consumption, and  N ρ   denotes the North’s rate of time 
preference.  The parameter  N γ  is related to North’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  N s  say, 
by 
1 (1 ) NN s γ
− =− , so that the restriction  0 N γ <  implies  1 N s < , an assumption broadly consistent 
with the empirical evidence. 
2 
                                                 
2 Early empirical evidence based on consumption data, strongly supported  1 N s < .  More recent studies based on data 
drawn from financial markets obtains larger estimates for  N s , but still less than unity; see Guvenen (2005).   6
The South has no capital and hence does not invest.  Its sole economic activity lies in 
resource extraction, which is done by employing labor alone in accordance with the constant returns 
to scale production function 
     ( ) ( ) S R tb L t =        ( 5 )  
We also assume that South’s production is unconstrained by labor availability,  ( ). S Lt
3  
Resource extraction causes pollution which accumulates locally and is internalized only in 
the South.  However, technology accumulated in the North diffuses to the South to reduce this 
damage, albeit at a diminishing rate.  Thus, the resulting patterns of trade and growth are further 
complicated due to the presence of local externalities. 
The level of pollution in the South, P, evolves in accordance with: 









=−         ( 6 )  
where 1 θ >  measures the exponential order of environmental damage due to extraction, 01 ε < <  is a 
technology diffusion (spillover) parameter signifying the degree of applicability of technology to 
pollution reduction and 0 1 P δ <<  denotes the constant instantaneous rate that the pollution decays 
naturally.
4   
In addition to per capita consumption, the utility of South’s representative agent depends 
inversely upon the stock of pollution, P.  Facing North’s demand for the resource, South’s planner 
takes North’s policies as given and chooses terms of trade to maximize South’s welfare, namely, 
0
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∫    (7) 
                                                 
3 That is, the population growth rate in the South is greater than or equal to the growth rate of the demand for the 
resource by the North. Also, if it is assumed that the supply of labor in the South is perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage 
() wt  in terms of the industrial good, the nature of the labor force coupled with the CRS production function would then 
determine labor income per unit of raw material as  () wt b = .  Competitive firms in the South will charge a price equal to 
the private marginal cost of resource extraction  () wt b = . The assumed social planner in the South levies an export tax, 
not only to internalize the social cost of pollution, but also to extract monopoly profit from the North. 
4 Equation (6) models pollution as a “joint output” with resources in the South, increasing with its extraction.     7
subject to (1), (2b), (3) and (6),  0 (0) PP = ,  0 (0) KK = , and  0 S C ≥ , where  S ρ  is South’s rate of time 
preference.  The exponent 01 τ << reflects the degree to which South’s representative agent 
perceives pollution as a public bad and D converts pollution into units of utility.  Following Eriksson 
and Zehaie (2002), we shall call the ratio  S PL
τ  the perceived pollution.  Note that  0 τ =  
corresponds to the case where pollution exhibits pure public bad characteristics: if both pollution and 
population are doubled, the pollution that each individual suffers from doubles as well.  On the other 
hand,  1 τ =  corresponds to the case where pollution exhibits pure private bad characteristics; 
doubling pollution and the population results in no more disutility of pollution per person. 
2.2. Cooperative North/South Trade 
In designing cooperative strategies, North and South must agree in advance as to how they 
will share the potential gains from cooperation. The distributive outcome will depend on the weights, 
ω , that are attached to the respective welfares. The determination of the value of ω  most likely to 
prevail in a cooperative agreement requires a bargaining framework which recognizes the relative 
power of the participants. This is outside the scope of our inquiry. Instead, to enable welfare 
comparisons across scenarios, we assume exogenously given weights. The Pareto efficient solution 
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∫∫   (8) 
subject to (1), (2a), (2b), (3) and (6),  0 (0) AA = ,  0 (0) PP = ,  0 (0) KK = , and  , 0 NS CC ≥ . 
Cooperation between North and South needs to be supported by binding agreements. Pre-
commitment is difficult in the absence of suitable institutions that can enforce global decisions. 
Nonetheless, cooperative solutions, though lacking credibility, are important insofar as they indicate 
the welfare loses that are likely to ensue given a lack of commitment. 
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3. Analytical Solution  
Given the returns to scale properties of the underlying production functions, the long-run 
equilibrium of the trade game, be it cooperative or non-cooperative, is not stationary, but will 
involve steady growth that reflects the underlying technology and preference structure.   
Consequently, in order to express the model in terms of stationary quantities it needs to be 
appropriately scaled to reflect the equilibrium of ongoing growth; see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).  
To that end, and irrespective of the trading regime, we envisage a steady-state equilibrium in which a 
number of balanced growth conditions hold.  First, since the final goods, Y, are either consumed in 
the North,  N C , or in the South,  S C , or invested in physical capital, K, they all grow at the same 
constant rate. Second, technology, A, the pollution stock in the South, P, raw materials, R, and the 
relative price, p, all converge to (different) constant rates.  Third, we assume that the ratio of the 
positive marginal benefits of per capita consumption to the negative marginal benefits of pollution in 
the South remain constant. 
Given these assumptions, to determine the respective balanced growth rates, we take 
logarithmic differentials of the production functions (2a), (2b), the pollution evolution function (6), 
and the term in square parentheses of the integrand of (7).  After some algebraic manipulation, we 
obtain:  
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ()
() 1 ˆˆ ˆˆ
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where ^ denotes the steady-state growth rate and  , , , , , i giYA P Rp =  are the respective “growth 
factors”. 
These long-run equilibrium growth rates have been written in a recursive form.  First, (9a) 
expresses the common long-run growth rate pertaining to production, capital accumulation in the 
North, and consumption in the two regions.  Given  Y g , (9b) – (9e) then yield the corresponding 
expressions for the growth rate of technology, pollution, resource extraction, and the relative price.  
As a general observation, all the structural parameters have broad effects on the growth rates, 
reflecting the high degree of interaction between the two economies.  Thus, even though North is 
indifferent to South’s pollution when choosing its optimal policies, nonetheless, some pollution 
parameters enter as determinants of North’s long-run consumption, capital, output and technology 
growth rates.  Notably, in an environment in which steady-state growth is possible, a change in the 
technology spillover or in the environmental damage rate in the South, affects not only the levels of 
North’s optimal policies, but also their permanent growth rates.  
In particular, the following features of the equilibrium merit comment.  First,  ˆ 0 Y θ ∂∂ <  and 
ˆ 0 Y ε ∂∂ >, implying that an increase in the long-run rate of environmental damage due to extraction 
in the South has an adverse effect on the growth rate of output and consumption, while an 
improvement in the technology of pollution reduction raises the long-run growth rate.  This is 
because more environmental damage tends to discourage resource extraction, while the latter has the 
opposite effect.  Second, an increase in the growth rate of North’s final output tends to raise the 
growth rate of knowledge and the growth rate of resource extraction, as well as the growth rate of 
the relative price.   
An interesting aspect concerns the long-run behavior of pollution.  To simplify things, we 
assume the plausible case of a common population growth rate,  NS nn = .  In which case 
   [ ] ˆ sgn( ) ( 1) SY Pg γ τ =− +  
Thus, whether the long-run equilibrium is associated with positive or negative growth of pollution in 
the South depends upon (i) the growth rate in the North, and (ii) South’s perception of pollution as a 
“bad”.  In the case that North’s per capita growth rate is zero,  1 Y g = , and pollution operates as a 
pure public bad,  0 τ = , the long-run pollution in the south is constant.  If  0 S γ < , growth in the North   10
implies a steady reduction of pollution in the South and vice versa, while given North’s growth rate, 
the perceived privatization of pollution in the South ( 0 τ > ) generates a steady increase in pollution.  
To discuss the transitional dynamics for the trade games, we transform each variable so that 
it is stationary in the steady state. Thus, we define the scaled variables 
as: ,
Y g
N yY L ≡ ,
Y g
N kK L ≡ ,
Y g
nN N cC L ≡ ,
A g
N aA L ≡ ,
R g






N PP L ≡ . For 
convenience, we shall refer to
* ,, ,,, n ykc arp , 
*
s cp r ≡ , and 
* P  as scale-adjusted quantities.
5  
Now, we can re-write the scale-adjusted output, and the rates of technology, physical capital and 
pollution stock as: 
    ()
K AL R
Y ya u v k r
α α αα φ =        ( 1 0 a )  
  [ ]
** * (1 ) (1 ) ,   
K AL
AA A A A N A aa u v k a ja n g
β ββ φδ δ δ δ =− − − ≡ − = +     (10b) 
   
** * ,   nK K K N Y ky c p r k n g δδ δ =−− − = +       ( 1 0 c )  
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=− = +       (10d) 
3.1. Open-loop Nash Equilibrium Solution 
We begin by considering the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution of the non-cooperative 
trade game.  After transforming the variables in (4) into the scale-adjusted quantities, North’s 
planning problem can be expressed as choosing its rate of consumption,  n c , its demand for 
resources, r, allocation of labor and capital, u and v, and rates of accumulation of capital, k , and 
technology, a  , to maximize: 






Jc e d t
γρ
γ
∞ − =∫  (1 ) nN Y N N gn ρ ργ = −−     (11) 
subject to (10a) – (10c),  0 0, (0) n ck k ≥= , and  0 (0) aa = , where South’s terms of trade are taken as 
given.  Performing the optimization, the following necessary conditions obtain:
6 
                                                 
5 See Eicher and Turnovsky (1999). 
6 The same optimality conditions are obtained if one performs the optimization with respect to the original variables and 
then transforms to the scale-adjusted quantities; see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999).   11






− =         ( 1 2 a )  






       (12b) 






       ( 1 2 c )  






α =         (12d) 











      ( 1 2 e )  











     ( 1 2 f )  





→∞ →∞ ==       (12g) 
where  12 , λ λ  are the shadow values of aggregate physical capital and knowledge, respectively. 
Equation (12a) states that along the optimal paths the marginal utility of consumption should 
equal the shadow value of physical capital at every point in time. Equations (12b) and (12c) 
determine the sectoral allocations of labor and capital so that their respective marginal products are 
equated across sectors.  Equation (12d) asserts that the marginal product of the resource must equal 
its cost, p.  The next two equations describe the two arbitrage conditions.  The first equates the net 
return to physical capital to the return on consumption, both measured in terms of the final output. 
Analogously, (12f) requires the return on technology be equated to the return on consumption, both 
expressed in units of knowledge.  Finally, (12g) expresses the transversality conditions. 
Combining (12d) with (10a), North’s demand for the natural resource can be expressed as 
   () () ()
1 1
* 1 1 K AL R R
RY ra u v k p
α αα α α αφ
− − − =        ( 1 3 )  
From equations (10a), (10b), (12b) and (12c), the respective optimal shares of labor and capital in 
the final good production are  () 12 ,, , uu a k λλ =  and  ( ) 12 ,, , vv a k λλ = , which can be shown to 
have the following properties:   12
   ()( ) ( ) ( ) sgn sgn ;sgn sgn LL KK uk vk α βα β ∂∂ = − ∂∂ = −  
   ()()( ) sgn sgn sgn AA ua va α β ∂∂ = ∂∂ = −   
Intuitively, an increase in the stock of physical capital or technology raises the productivity of both 
sectors in proportion to an amount that depends upon the respective productive elasticity.  Resources 
will therefore move toward the sector in which that input has the greater production elasticity (is 
more productive). 
We turn now to South.  Faced with North’s demand for the resource, given by (13), and 
taking North’s policies as given, South’s planner chooses a path of scale-adjusted terms of trade to 
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subject to (10a), (10c), and (10d),  0 s c ≥ ,  0 (0) kk = , and 
**
0 (0) PP = . 
The necessary optimality conditions for the South are: 
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where  12 , µ µ  are the respective shadow values of the stocks of aggregate physical capital and 
pollution. 
From equation (15a), South’s optimal terms of trade must be so chosen that the sum of 
incremental benefits from consumption and physical capital equals the marginal cost of pollution.  
Notice from equation (15b), that the value of an extra unit of physical capital stock in the South, not 
surprisingly, evolves differently from the North insofar as the former internalizes the interaction   13
between capital and pollution accumulation.  Equation (15c), on the other hand, shows how the 
marginal social cost of pollution will evolve as pollution itself accumulates over time. Remembering 
that along the balanced growth path scale-adjusted pollution is constant, and solving for 2 µ  from 
equation (15c), the transversality condition (15d) is satisfied only if the equilibrium shadow value of 
the scaled pollution is equal to 
* /( ) P s D δ ρ −+  throughout. 
Next, we consider the Nash equilibrium of this game at the steady state.  A joint stationary 
solution of the optimality conditions for both regions determines the long-run equilibrium of the 
trade game.  Hence, assuming steady state, the following set of equations constitutes the Nash 
equilibrium where the stationary variables are denoted by ~: 
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We proceed to solve the system of equations as follows: First, we obtain the equilibrium 
growth rate of technology,  ja JA =      from (16b).  Given the growth rate of technology, (16g) then   14
implies the stationary sectoral allocation of labor, u  .  Having derived u  , we use Eqs. (16e) and (16f) 
to solve for the long run sectoral allocation of capital, v , and the output-capital ratio,  yk   , 
respectively.  Given  yk   , the ratio of the South’s consumption to capital, 
* p rk    can now be 
derived from (16d).  Knowing  yk    and 
* p rk   , (16a) determines the ratio of the North’s 
consumption to capital,  n ck   , while (16c) and (16h) determine the ratio 
* S Pk
γ   .  Given 
* S Pk
γ   , u  , 
and  v , the ratio 
(1 ) SK A rk
γε β β θ +−    can be obtained from equations (16b) and (16c).  We use the 
production function for the final good and equation (16b) to find the stock of capital, k , given 
(1 ) SK A rk
γε β β θ +−   ,  yk   ,  u  , and v .  Having obtained k ,  a   and r  are derived from equation (16b) 
given u   and v  and the ratio 
(1 ) SK A rk
γε β β θ +−   . Finally, given r  and 
* p rk    we solve for 
* p  . 
3.2. Open-loop Cooperative Solution 
In order for the cooperative equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that the scale-adjusted 
discount rates be the same for both regions;  ns ρ ρρ = = .  Although this condition is not required for 
non-cooperative equilibrium, nonetheless, we choose parameter values to satisfy this requirement so 
that we can compare the equilibria under cooperative and non-cooperative modes of trade. 
Written in terms of the scale-adjusted quantities, the Pareto efficient paths maximize the 
weighted sum of welfares 
*
*
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subject to (10a)-(10d),  , 0 ns cc ≥ ,  00 (0) , (0) ,  kk aa = = and 
**
0 (0) PP = .  Although, at first blush, 
this may seem like a straightforward optimization problem in contrast with the non-cooperative 
mode of the game, any attempt at solution defies this early optimism.  Unfortunately, the steady state 
of the model does not admit a closed-form solution unless  0.5 ω =  and  NS γ γ = , except for the 
sectoral allocations of labor and physical capital, and the output capital ratio. 
The necessary optimality conditions are: 
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where  12 ,, υ υ  and  3 υ  are the shadow values of aggregate physical capital, technology and pollution, 
respectively. 
We note from (18a) and (18b) that along the Pareto efficient paths, the weighted marginal 
utilities of consumption in both regions are the same. Moreover, equations (18a), (18b), and (18c), 
imply an efficient resource price which would equate the marginal global benefits of resource use 
(the weighted marginal utility of consumption in both regions times the marginal product of the 
resource) to the marginal pollution costs in the South (valued at the shadow price of pollution in the 
South).  Also, equations (18d) and (18e), indicate a sectoral allocation rule for labor and capital such 
that productivities are equalized at the margin.  Finally, equations (18f), (18g) and (18h) indicate 
how the globally efficient shadow values of k, a, and 
* P  will move over time. Once again, note that 
equation (18h) and the corresponding transversality condition in (18i) imply that the optimal shadow 
price of scaled pollution is constant. 
The following system of equations indicate the steady state of the cooperative trade game 
where the efficient levels of the stationary variables are denoted by ˇ   16
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Using (19b) one can get the equilibrium growth rate of knowledge,  ja JA =
    .  Then, 
equation (19f) can be used to determine the constant sectoral allocation of labor, u .
7  Subsequently, 
equations (19d) and (19e) will give us the sectoral allocation of capital, v  , and the output-capital 
ratio,  yk
  , respectively.  If  0.5 ω =  and  NS γ γ = , the equilibrium values of the rest of the variables 
are found as follows, otherwise one needs to employ a numerical method.  Given  yk   , the ratios of 
the South’s consumption to capital, 
* p rk   , and the North’s consumption to capital,  n ck   , can be 
derived from (19a) using (19h).  Having obtained  yk    and  n ck   , (19c) and (19g) determine the 
ratio 
* N Pk
γ   .  Given 
* N Pk
γ   , u  , and v , the ratio 
(1 ) SK A rk
γε β β θ +−    can be obtained from equations 
(19b) and (19c).  The production function for the final good and equation (19b) are used to find the 
stock of capital, k , given 
(1 ) SK A rk
γε β β θ +−   ,  yk   , u  , and v .  Knowing k , a   and r  are derived from 
                                                 
7 Note from Eq.s (19d) and (19f) that under cooperation higher fractions of capital and labor are allocated to the 
technology sector due to the fact that the marginal benefit from the accelerated knowledge accumulation from the North 
is now internalized in both regions.   17
equation (19b) given u   and v  and the ratio 
(1 ) SK A rk
γε β β θ +−   . Finally, given r  and 
* p rk   , we solve 
for 
* p  . 
4. Simulations of the Model 
We discretize the cooperative and non-cooperative games along the lines suggested by 
Mercenier and Michel (1994), which ensures the steady state invariance between the continuous 
model and its discrete analog, and use genetic algorithms (GAs) to approximate the steady state as 
well as the transient dynamics under various parameter configurations.  The numerical procedures 
are described in detail in Appendix A.  
4.1. Numerical Parameters and Baseline Equilibria 
Table 1 displays the set of benchmark parameter values used in the numerical simulations. 




Table 1: Benchmark parameters 
Production  1.0 Y φ =   0.40 K α = 0.60 L α =   0.20 A α =   0.15 R α =
Technology  1.0 A φ =   0.20 K β = 0.50 L β =   0.60 A β =    
Pollution  0.07 P δ =   0.20 ε =   2.0 θ =   0.0 τ =    
Preferences  0.04 N ρ = 0.04 S ρ =   0.5 N γ = −   0.5 S γ =−   0.05 D =  
Depreciation and population  0.05 K δ =   0.01 A δ =   0.015 N n = 0.015 S n =    
Production of both the final goods and the new technologies exhibit increasing returns to 
scale.
9  We assume that each region has the same rate of time preference and intertemporal elasticity 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Lucas (1988), Ortigueira and Santos (1997), and Jones (1995). 
9 Production elasticities in the production of final output are well documented.  However, much less empirical literature 
exists with respect to the production function for knowledge, especially if separate elasticities for labor, capital and 
technology are required. For example, Adams (1990) and Caballero and Jaffee (1993) conduct thorough empirical 
investigations that are ultimately unsuccessful in reporting separate elasticities for labor and technology.  Our 
parameterization employs the plausible assumption that the production function for knowledge is relatively intensive in 
knowledge.   18
of substitution, of 4 percent and 0.67, respectively.
10  Physical capital is assumed to depreciate at 5 
percent, which is a common benchmark in the real business cycle literature; see e.g. Cooley (1995).  
Knowledge, on the other hand, depreciates at a slower rate of 1 percent, while the rate of 
depreciation of pollution is assumed to be 7 percent. Populations in both regions are assumed to 
grow at 1.5 percent.  Information on pollution parameter values is sparse, and therefore, we conduct 
some sensitivity analysis with alternative parameter values.  Equal weights,  0.5 ω = , are assigned to 
both regions in the cooperative trade game.  
 
Table 2:  Benchmark total discounted welfares 
North South Global 
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop.   
-24.6611 -32.8438 -63.8642 -38.5686 -88.5253 -71.4124
Percent change from  
Coop. to Non-coop  24.91  -65.59  -23.96 
 
Table 3: Benchmark Equilibrium Values 
* p 
  r 
  u 






  a 
  n c 
 
Cooperation 
  4.529 1.125 0.893 0.933 49.350 3.089  317.629 5.094
* p    r   u    v   k  
* P    a    n c   
Non-cooperation 
  1.275 1.823 0.899 0.937 54.673 8.225  298.057 9.035
Percent change from 
Coop. to Non-coop.  -71.86  62.14 0.75  0.47  10.79  166.25  -6.16  77.37
These benchmark parameter values yield the growth factors:  1.710 Y g = , 2.105 A g = , 
0.355 P g =−  and  0.033 R g = , implying a per capita growth rate of output, capital, and consumption 
of around 1.07 percent.  Also, the benchmark equilibrium is characterized by an increasing resource 
extraction and a declining pollution in the South.  Table 2 reports the total discounted North, South, 
and global welfares. The equilibrium values of other key variables are given in Table 3.    
                                                 
10 As noted, the empirical evidence on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is quite far-ranging.  While early 
evidence drawn from consumption data obtained estimates of around 0.1 (Hall, 1988), subsequent studies based on 
financial data suggest a larger estimate.  Our value of 0.67 is consistent with the value proposed by Guvenen (2005).  But 
we should note that estimates of unity and even greater have been obtained (Beaudry and van Wincoop, 1995).   19
Table 2 brings out a conflict between North and South with regard to the benefits from 
cooperation.  By acting non-cooperatively North increases its welfare by 24.91 percent, while 
reducing South’s welfare by 65.59 percent.  The net effect of this unwillingness to cooperate is that 
the inefficiencies associated with non-cooperation impose a severe global welfare loss of 23.96 
percent.  In setting the resource price, South internalizes the local cost of pollution, as well as 
extracting monopoly rent from North.  From a global perspective, to the extent that North also cares 
about the South’s environment, resource prices would be inefficiently low because they would 
reflect only the local cost of pollution.  But this would be partly alleviated due to the exercise of 
monopoly power by the South.  Thus, insofar as North cares about South’s environment, South’s 
monopoly power has some beneficial effects.  
For its part, North chooses a resource allocation so as to maximize its own welfare.   
Resources that go to the production of final goods yield immediate higher consumption while those 
that are employed in the technology sector will yield a higher consumption only in the future. Since 
(i) delaying consumption is costly, (ii) resources that pollute South are employed only in the final 
goods production, and (iii) neither region internalizes the knowledge spillover, the non-cooperative 
equilibrium leads to an inefficiently small knowledge sector from a global perspective. [298.1 vs. 
317.5].  As a result, non-cooperative behavior leads to an excess production of final goods, causing 
an over-accumulation of physical capital [54.7 vs. 49.4] and an over usage of resources [1.82 vs. 
1.13], the latter ultimately leading to an excessive level of pollution in the South [8.23 vs. 3.09].  
Next, we study the dynamic responses of regions to changes in some structural parameters. 
4.2. Dynamic Responses to Structural Changes 
Tables 4-7 and Figures 1-4 summarize the dynamic responses from the initial benchmark 
equilibrium, in response to various structural changes, namely (i) a 30 percent increase of 
productivity in the final output sector; (ii) a 30 percent increase of productivity in the knowledge 
producing sector; (iii) an increase in knowledge diffusion from  0.20 ε =  to  0.60 ε = ; (iv) a doubling 
in the resource damage rate from  2.0 θ =  to  4.0 θ = . 
   20
4.2.1. Productivity shocks in final output sector 
Consider an increase in the productivity of the final good sector from  1 Y φ =  to 1.30.  Being a 
non-scale model, all long-run growth rates remain unaltered in the face of change in scale parameters 
such as  Y φ .  The productivity shock, however, sets into motion transitional dynamics that have 
permanent level effects; irrespective of the trading regime, the equilibrium levels of the scaled 
variables change significantly, leading to substantial welfare improvements in both regions. The 
results are summarized in Tables 4a and 4b.   
 
Table 4a: Equilibrium Values 
* p 
  r 
  u 






  a 
  n c 
 
Cooperation 
  8.204 1.019 0.893 0.933  80.961  2.412  406.831  8.357 
Percent change from 
benchmark 81.13  -9.43 0.00  0.00  64.05  -21.93  28.08  64.05 
* p    r   u    v   k  
* P    a    n c   
Non-cooperation 
  2.309 1.652 0.899 0.937 89.693  6.422  381.762 14.822 
Percent change from 
benchmark 81.13  -9.43 0.00  0.00  64.05  -21.93  28.08  64.05 
Percent change from 
Coop to Non-coop.   -71.86  62.14 0.75  0.47  10.79  166.25  -6.16  77.37 
 
Table 4b: Total discounted welfares 
North South Global 
 
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. 
  -20.5603 -27.7307 -56.6510 -32.9034 -77.2113 -60.6341
Percent change from 
benchmark  16.63 15.57 11.29 14.69 12.78 15.09 
Percent change from 
Coop to Non-coop.  25.86 -72.17 -27.34 
 
The paths of some key variables are plotted in Figures 1.a)-1.l). By and large, dynamic 
adjustments are fairly similar whether regions cooperate or not. One should take note, however, of 
the inefficiencies in the non-cooperative adjustments due largely to the discount on the true global   21
benefits of knowledge and costs of pollution. As such, non-cooperative transient dynamics favor 
production and accumulation of the final good over knowledge and hence an inefficiently high usage 
of the resource and excessive pollution in the South. 
The transitional dynamics may be explained as follows. The immediate effect of the 
productivity increase is to raise North’s demand for all productive factors, including the resource, to 
which South’s immediate response is to raise its price.   It does so more than proportionately under 
cooperation, so that the net effect is an instant decline in its usage by the North.  Relatively speaking, 
the globally efficient levels of the final good and pollution are smaller so that efficiency calls for a 
sharper hike in the resource price both to reflect the benefits from knowledge spillovers and also the 
costs of pollution. At the same time, the higher productivity in the final output sector induces North 
to shift both labor and capital toward that sector but again less so under cooperation. 
As a result of the higher productivity in the final output sector and the reallocation of 
resources that it attracts, physical capital accumulates rapidly, while the production of knowledge 
actually declines slightly for a brief period.  Under non-cooperation, immediate increase in resource 
demand in the North coupled with the initial decrease in the production of knowledge implies that 
pollution abatement in the South decreases, so that the level of pollution increases for a short period 
of time. Under cooperation, however, instant decrease in resource demand in the North offsets the 
effect of initial decline in technology production, so that the level of pollution immediately starts to 
decline. 
Over time, as physical capital is accumulated in the North, the productivity of knowledge is 
enhanced and it too is accumulated.  Finally, the increase in demand for the resource due to the 
continuing expansion in economic activity in the North induces the South to continue raising its 
price, the effect of which is to more than offset the rising demand, so that the rate of resource 
extraction continues to decline, albeit at a declining rate.   
As a consequence of the declining resource extraction, accompanied by the (generally) 
expansion in technology, the level of pollution steadily declines and eventually levels off at a level 
approximately 21.93 percent below its initial level under both cooperative and non-cooperative   22
trades.  The important point to observe is that a thirty percent increase in productivity in North’s 
final output sector leads to a substantial decline in pollution in the South.  
4.2.2. Productivity shocks in technology sector 
A thirty percent increase in the productivity of knowledge production does not change the 
long-run growth rates. Relative to a comparable productivity increase in the final goods sector, 
changes in the equilibrium levels are smaller, leading to more modest welfare gains; see Tables 5a 
and 5b. Once again, the percentage changes in equilibrium values from their respective benchmark 
values are equal.  
 
Table 5a: Equilibrium Values 
* p 
  r 
  u 






  a 
  n c 
 
Cooperation 
  5.837 1.139 0.893 0.933 64.394 2.704 699.127  6.647 
Percent change from 
benchmark  28.88 1.25 0.00 0.00 30.48  -12.46 120.11  30.48 
* p    r   u    v   k  
* P    a    n c   
Non-cooperation 
  1.643 1.846 0.899 0.937 71.339 7.200 656.048 11.789 
Percent change from 
benchmark 28.88 1.25  0.00  0.00  30.48  -12.46 120.11  30.48 
Percent change from 
Coop. to Non-coop.  -71.86 62.14 0.75 0.47 10.79  166.25 -6.16  77.37 
 
Table 5b:  Total discounted welfares 
North South Global 
 
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. 
  -23.9732 -32.0425 -62.8934 -37.6677 -86.8666 -69.7101
Percent change from 
Benchmark  2.79 2.44 1.52 2.34 1.87 2.38 
Percent change from 
Coop to Non-coop.  25.18  -66.97  -24.61 
The dynamic transition paths are now illustrated in Figures 2.a)-2.l) and may be explained 
along the following lines.  In contrast to a productivity increase in the final goods sector, higher   23
productivity in the technology sector does not have an immediate direct simulating effect on the 
demand for the resource. Instead, its effect is more indirect.  
On impact, North shifts both labor and capital toward the technology sector because of the 
increased productivity there. Under cooperation, since the efficient resource price reflects the 
benefits of pollution abatement from knowledge accumulation, it slightly rises to discourage 
production of the final goods and thereby accommodating the sectoral reallocation of labor and 
capital. Under non-cooperation, however, pollution costs are only internalized by the South while the 
benefits of knowledge spillovers are altogether discounted. Hence, the shift in labor and capital to 
technology sector is not as much. Nonetheless, the demand for resources fall leading the South to 
lower the resource  price for a short period of time after which resource use rapidly increases and 
peaks. In both instances, knowledge accumulates rapidly, while the capital stock actually declines 
slightly for a brief period because of the higher productivity and the increased allocation of labor and 
capital in the technology sector.  
However, over time, as knowledge is accumulated in the North, the productivity of capital is 
enhanced and it too is accumulated.  The expansion of final output in the North stimulates the 
demand for resources. This induces South to start raising its price.  However, its effect is to less than 
offset the rising demand under cooperation, so the rate of resource extraction keeps increasing at a 
steady, though declining rate. Under non-cooperation, however, the effect of increasing price is to 
more than offset the rising demand, so that the rate of resource extraction, after the brief initial 
increase and peak, declines at a steady, though declining rate.   
The increase in capital accumulation and final output induces the North to gradually shift its 
capital and labor back toward the production of final output, ultimately restoring the initial 
allocation.  The initial increase in resource extraction under non-cooperation slightly increases the 
level of pollution in the South.  However, this declines after a short period due to the decline in the 
rate of resource extraction plus the improved abatement due to the higher stock of technology.  In the 
long run, pollution in the South declines substantially by about 12.46 percent.  Again a technological 
improvement in the North, this time in the knowledge sector, leads to a long-run reduction in 
pollution, and therefore an improvement in South’s welfare, albeit modest.    24
4.2.3. Increase in the Knowledge Diffusion 
We now investigate the effects of an improvement in the diffusion of knowledge in the South 
as represented by an increase in ε  from 0.20 to 0.60.  This form of technological increase does have 
implications for the long-run growth rates, raising the growth factors of final output,  Y g , technology, 
A g ,  and resource,  R g , to 1.833, 2.166 and 0.442 respectively, while reducing the growth factor of 
pollution,  P g , to -0.416.  Observe from Table 6b the increase in regional welfares attendant with 
stronger technology diffusion. We see about 9.42 percent improvement in global welfare with 
uncoordinated trading policies attesting to the importance of access to knowledge. The implication is 
that returns from investment in knowledge to North are not only in the form of improved 
productivity there, but also in the form of lower resource prices thanks now to the higher rate of 
pollution abatement in the South. Moreover, with the increased South’s capacity to absorb 
technology, pollution will be less of a drag on growth in North.  The equilibrium values with the 
higher knowledge spillover rate are reported in Table 6a. 
 
Table 6a: Equilibrium Values 
* p 
  r 
  u 






  a 
  n c 
 
Cooperation 
  2.045 3.594 0.879 0.924 70.584 2.619 442.524  7.352 
Percent change from 
benchmark  -54.84 219.61  -1.49  -0.94 43.03 -15.22  39.32  44.33 
* p    r   u    v   k  
* P    a    n c   
Non-cooperation 
  0.568 5.433 0.899 0.937 71.001 7.238 322.253  11.991
Percent change from 
benchmark -55.42  197.95  -0.013 -0.008 29.87 -12.01  8.12  32.72 
Percent change from 
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Table 6b:  Total discounted welfares 
North South Global 
 
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. 
  -21.8239 -29.1857 -58.3580 -34.5445 -80.1819 -63.7302
Percent change from 
Benchmark  11.50  11.14 8.62 10.43 9.42 10.76 
Percent change from 
Coop to Non-coop.  25.22  -68.94  -25.81 
First, note the rise in the optimal long-run resource/capital and resource/knowledge ratios 
under both cooperative and non-cooperative modes of trade. This will be true because a higher rate 
of knowledge diffusion will reduce the long-run cost of pollution and thereby the supply price of 
resources, and make the increased use of resources for any given level of physical capital and 
knowledge optimal.  Also noteworthy from Figures 3. c) –j) and Table 6a is the increase in the 
stationary physical capital and knowledge stocks and the shares of labor and physical capital in the 
knowledge sector. Higher physical capital due to lower price of resources allows North to shift 
resources to knowledge sector, increasing knowledge stock. Finally, observe the fall in the pollution 
level. The marginal reduction in the pollution level due to higher knowledge stock outweighs the 
incremental increase due to a higher resource use so that the overall long-run pollution level will fall.    
As for the dynamic adjustments, figures 3. a)-l) show that with higher knowledge spillovers, 
the marginal cost of pollution falls, thus inducing South to instantly reduce the price for the resource, 
to which North’s immediate response is to increase its usage. In the short run, the lower resource 
price enables North to accumulate more physical capital, which, under non-cooperation, causes 
North to shift resources to the production of final output. This causes a temporary decline in level of 
technology, which however, is reversed as the physical capital is accumulated and the productivity 
of knowledge is enhanced.  Under cooperation, since North internalizes the knowledge spillovers, 
resources are shifted to the technology sector.  
Over time, as knowledge is accumulated in the North, the productivity of capital is enhanced 
and it too is accumulated.  The expansion of final output in the North further stimulates the demand 
for resources. This induces South to raise its price.  However, its effect is less than offset the rising   26
demand under cooperation, so the rate of resource extraction keeps increasing at a steady, though 
declining rate. Under non-cooperation, however, the effect of increasing price is to more than offset 
the rising demand, so that the rate of resource extraction, after the initial instant increase, declines at 
a steady, though declining rate, leveling off at 197.95 percent of its benchmark value.   
While the increase in resource extraction increases pollution in the South, the improvement 
in the diffusion of knowledge together with the increase in its stock has the opposite effect.  Whereas 
the latter effect is dominant throughout under cooperation, under non-cooperation, the former 
initially dominates to give in, eventually, to the latter. Ultimately, the level of pollution declines by 
15.22 percent and 12.01 percent under cooperation and non-cooperation respectively.  
4.2.4. Increase in resource damage rate 
The final experiment doubles the order of environmental damage due to resource extraction 
from  2.0 θ =  to  4.0 θ = .  As far as balanced growth factors are concerned, the most notable effect is 
on  R g  which falls from 0.033 to 0.017. The other growth factors,  Y g ,  A g  and  P g all decrease 
slightly namely, to 1.705, 2.103 and -0.353 respectively.   
The new equilibrium values and the associated welfares are displayed in Tables 7a and 7b. 
 
Table 7a: Equilibrium Values 
* p 
  r 
  u 






  a 
  n c 
 
Cooperation 
  4.644 1.061 0.896 0.935  47.619 1.568  295.551  4.927
Percent change from 
benchmark  2.53 -5.67 0.38 0.24 -3.51  -49.23  -6.95 -3.28 
* p    r   u    v   k  
* P    a    n c   
Non-cooperation 
  1.566 1.362 0.899 0.937  50.224 4.290  286.270  8.293
Percent change from 
benchmark 22.86  -25.30 0.001 0.0003 -8.14  -47.84  -3.95  -8.22 
Percent change from 
Coop. to Non-coop.  -66.28 28.40 0.38  0.24  5.47 173.56 -3.14 68.32
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Table 7b:  Total discounted welfares 
North South Global 
 
Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. Non-coop. Coop. 
  -25.4403 -33.0432 -60.8849 -37.0941 -86.3252 -70.1373
 Percent change from 
Benchmark  -3.16  -0.61 4.66 3.82 2.49 1.79 
Percent change from 
Coop to Non-coop.   23.01  -64.14  -23.08 
Notice that in contrast to a favorable productivity shock in the final good sector in the North 
or to an increase in knowledge diffusion in the South the welfare effects are quite modest. What is 
more surprising is that North would suffer from such an increase in the potential damage to South’s 
environment while South would be a beneficiary regardless of the trading regime. This could be 
explained by noting from Table 7a and 7b that consumption in both regions falls but pollution is 
reduced drastically thereby causing a slight improvement in South’s welfare. When resource 
extraction becomes more harmful to South’s environment, the long-run marginal cost of pollution 
rises leading South to increase the resource price. With higher long-run resource prices, North cuts 
production of both the final good and the technology. Also, since the resource is relatively more 
expensive now, the final good is produced with relatively less resource and more capital and labor 
that become available from the diminished technology sector. While the decreased resource use 
causes pollution in the South to decline, decreased technology has the opposite effect. But the former 
dominates resulting in lower pollution in the South. With cooperation, as pollution is globally 
internalized, the efficient resource price rises less so that these effects on welfares are less 
pronounced. While North’s welfare deteriorates less, South’s welfare improves less, too.  
The dynamic adjustments are illustrated in Figures 4.a)-l).  When the order of environmental 
damage increases, the marginal cost of pollution rises. This induces South to immediately increase 
the price for the resource, to which North’s instant response is to decrease its usage, causing the rate 
of physical capital accumulation to decline. Under non-cooperation, as only South internalizes the 
increased pollution costs, relative to the benchmark non-cooperative scenario, the rise in the resource 
price is much sharper. Increased resource price and decreased productivity in the final good sector   28
also induces North to shift resources toward the production of knowledge in the short run.  This 
causes a temporary increase in level of technology, which however, is reversed as the physical 
capital is reduced and the productivity of knowledge declines.  Under cooperation, the resource price 
rises to reflect the now increased global cost of the resource extraction thereby inducing North to 
shift resources away from the production of knowledge in the short run to substitute for the resource 
in the production of the final good. 
Under non-cooperation, decreased resource use and initial increase in technology causes 
pollution to decrease rapidly. Under cooperation, while the decline in resource extraction decreases 
pollution in the South, the decrease in the stock of knowledge has the opposite effect.  However, the 
former effect dominates and since the decline in knowledge is in fact only modest, whereas the 
decline in resource extraction occurs immediately, the net effect is a rapid decline in the level of 
pollution in the South.  
As a result of declining resource demand and pollution, resource price starts decreasing. This 
causes the resource extraction to start picking up under non-cooperation.  However, the increase in 
price is less than proportionate under cooperation, so that the resource demand keeps declining. 
Eventually, resource extraction levels off at a level 5.67 percent less than its benchmark value under 
cooperation and 25.30 percent less than its benchmark value under non-cooperation.   
Under cooperation, the decline in pollution due to decreasing resource extraction keeps 
dominating the increase in pollution due to declining stock of knowledge, so that the level of 
pollution in the South keeps decreasing.  Under non-cooperation, pollution depreciates more than the 
increase in pollution due to increasing resource extraction and declining stock of knowledge, so that 
the level of pollution in the South keeps decreasing under non-cooperation as well.  Eventually, 
pollution levels off at a level around 49.23 percent of its initial value under cooperation and around 
47.84 percent of its initial value under non-cooperation. The change in the level of pollution is more 
significant in the cooperative game since the positive effect of knowledge spillovers on pollution 
accumulation is internalized in both regions.   
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5. Conclusion  
To highlight the potential strategic asymmetries in the world trade, the paper has constructed 
a dynamic game between the North and the South. South causes local pollution while extracting a 
resource that it sells to North at a monopoly price. North uses the resource, together with capital, 
labor, and knowledge to produce a final good to consume, to invest and to sell to South at a fixed 
world price. North's growth is endogenously generated by the technology sector that produces 
knowledge which flows freely to South to help abate pollution from resource extraction there. 
North chooses a resource allocation with a view to maximizing own welfare, ignoring the 
deleterious effects of its policies on South's environment. South, on the other hand, sets the resource 
price to reflect the local cost of pollution as well as to extract monopoly rent from North, neglecting 
the effects of its policy on North's growth. From a global perspective, resource prices are 
inefficiently low because they only reflect the local cost of pollution.  This, however, is partly 
alleviated by South's monopoly power. 
Moreover, while the final goods can be immediately consumed, labor and capital allocated to 
the technology sector will bring, via increased productivity, higher consumption only in the future. 
Given that delaying consumption is costly to North, that natural resources are employed only in the 
final goods production, and that neither region internalizes the knowledge spillovers, all lead to an 
inefficiently small knowledge sector from a global perspective. An excess production of the final 
goods causes an over accumulation of physical capital and an over use of resources, the latter 
ultimately leading to an excessive level of pollution in the South. These results are replicated under 
various parameter configurations. 
Further, although the pollution we consider is local in nature, it has global ramifications for 
growth. All else being the same, an increased rate of knowledge diffusion in the South makes 
resource extraction less costly, leading to lower prices and thus faster accumulation of both physical 
capital and knowledge in the North. Conversely, North's growth can be checked if resource 
extraction creates more damage to South's environment. Trade couples the regions and acts as a 
conduit for the local changes to be transmitted to each other. 
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Due to the inefficiencies that accompany the non-cooperative mode of trade, global welfare 
is substantially lower under non-cooperation than it is under cooperation. Also, a regime switch from 
a non-cooperative to a cooperative trade regime is always beneficial to South and harmful to North. 
Consequently, not only is North unwilling to cooperate, but also the inefficiencies that arise from 
such a reluctance is severe. 
The model can be extended in various directions.  To inquire whether North's reluctance for 
cooperation would change, a local pollution may also be added to accompany production of the final 
goods in the North. As a drawback, however, not only would the state space enlarge, making 
computation costlier, worse yet, balanced growth paths may not exist at all. Also, to enhance the 
credibility of the optimal regional policies, feedback Nash equilibria can be adopted as the solution 
concept. However, unless a linear-quadratic framework is adopted at the outset, numerical 
approximation of feedback Nash policies is fraught with difficulties. A part of our ongoing research 
agenda is to develop computationally efficient numerical methods to approximate feedback Nash 
equilibria.  Finally, this type of analysis carries important policy implications that are important to 
develop if natural resources are to be managed efficieintly. 
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Appendix A: Numerical Approximation of the Model 
In order to determine the open-loop Nash equilibria of the two-person differential trade 
game, two optimal control problems need to be solved simultaneously (Başar and Oldser, 1982). Our 
numerical solution strategy is first to transform the infinite horizon differential game into a finite 
horizon difference game using time aggregation as in Michel and Mercenier (1994). Then, GAs 
optimize each problem using asynchronous updating. 
In the cooperative trade game, the strategic rivalry that exists in the non-cooperative trade 
game is eliminated by way of an “arbitration” whereby the “global fitness” as the weighted sum of 
each region’s respective welfare (fitness) is maximized. The cooperative trade game is thus reduced 
to a typical control problem which can be solved by standard GA techniques (Krishnakumar and 
Goldberg, 1992 and Michalewicz, 1992). 
A.1. Discretization  
The discrete-time approximation of infinite horizon non-cooperative North/South trade 
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where H is the assumed terminal time when the stationary state is reached,  h ∆  is a scalar factor that 
converts the continuous flow into stock increments,  1 hh h tt + ∆ =− , and 
j µ  is the sequence of 
discount factors of the region  , iN S =  for which the stationary solution of the discrete-time 
problem is equivalent to the corresponding continuous-time problem. These sequences are given by 
the following recursions: 
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The functions  (.),   ,
j Gj N S =  denote the terminal values. The cooperative model is time 
aggregated in a similar fashion. 
A.2. Genetic Algorithms for Non-cooperative Open-loop Dynamic Games  
The trade games involve both equality and inequality constraints. The equalities are 
eliminated at the start by substitution. We penalize the remaining constraint violations by a large 
reduction in the fitness so as to remain within the feasible region.
11 
Each population, North and South, is randomly initialized and best performing policies are 
passed on to the other player (GA) via the computer shared memory. Then each GA breeds newer 
                                                 
11 See Michalewicz (1992) for various GA approaches to handle linear constraints.   36
and fitter populations of candidate solutions separately in the light of the best-to-date responses that 
are updated in every ten thousand generations. 
The following pseudo code shows the general outline of the algorithm for the two-region 
dynamic trade game:  
procedure  North  GA;       procedure  South  GA; 
begin         begin 
    randomly initialize Pop (0) N ;            randomly initialize Pop (0) S ; 
    shared memory;                shared memory; 
    synchronize;                 synchronize; 
    evaluate Pop (0) N                e v a l u a t e   Pop (0) S ; 
     1 z = ;                 1 z = ; 
    repeat                  repeat 
      select Pop ( ) N z  from Pop ( 1) N z − ;             select Pop ( ) S z  from Pop ( 1) S z− ; 
      copy best to shared memory;              copy best to shared memory; 
      synchronize if z mod 10000 = 0;               synchronize if z mod 10000 = 0; 
      crossover and mutate Pop ( ) N z ;              crossover and mutate Pop ( ) S z ; 
      evaluate Pop ( ) N z ;                 evaluate Pop ( ) S z ; 
       1 zz =+ ;                    1 zz = + ; 
    until (termination condition);            until (termination condition); 
e n d ;          e n d ;  
In each step of this algorithm, two GAs evolve a constant size population of potential 
solutions. The two GAs are separately evolved for ten thousand generations upon sharing their best 
to date responses. The synchronize statement in the above algorithm is a protocol whereby each 
party is to wait for the other side to update their respective best structures before proceeding with a 
new search. This approach reduces time complexity while at the same time ensuring the convergence 
to the global Nash equilibrium. 
A.3. Genetic Algorithm for Cooperative Games 
  Generally  speaking,  for  s control variables, T periods, and l potential solutions, a GA 
performs the following steps to optimize a control problem: (1) Randomly generate an initial   37
potential solution set, (2) Evaluate the fitness value for a solution set of sTl, (3) Apply selection, 
crossover, and mutation operations to each set of solutions to reproduce a new population, (4) 
Repeat steps (1), (2) and (3) until computation is terminated according to a convergence criterion, 
(5) Choose the solution set sT based on the best fitness value from the current generations as the 
optimal solution set. 
A.4. Genetic Algorithm Parameters  
Since GAs work with constant-size populations of candidate solutions, GA searches are 
initialized from a number of points. Initialization routines may vary. We however start from 
randomly generated populations so as not to prejudice the convergence of the populations on the 
initial ones. Therefore, a randomly initialized GA is less prone to numerical instability that may be 
caused by initialization. For the GA parameters which might cause instability, we used the 
parameters chosen and studied on various optimization experiments by Grefenstette (1986). From 
the result of the experiments in the paper, the convergence is self evident. The termination 
conditions are specified beforehand as a certain number of iterations. We gradually increase the 
number of iterations until no further improvements are observed. In the time-aggregated model, we 
assume 31 periods (H=30) with a dense equally spaced gridding of the time horizon T(t(H) = 450), 
which is sufficient to capture the convergence over time. 
As for the genetic operators in the numerical experiments, we use the public domain 
GENESIS as a platform (Grefenstette, 1990) and modify the GENESIS codes as we need them. All 
experiments are run on an IBM RS/6000 running AIX 5.2. A typical run uses population size, j = 50, 
runs one million generations, crossover rate is 0.60 and mutation rate is 0.001. The selection strategy 
is elitist so that the best performing strategy in the population of survivors is retained. None of the 
results depends on the values of genetic operators other than run time by the choice of number of 
generations. For each parameter configuration, we have to implement two separate experiments. 
Hence, we are limited by the increased computational costs in our scope for a complete sensitivity 
analysis 
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Appendix B: Transitional Dynamics (Coop.: Cooperative; Non-coop.: Non-cooperative) 
 
Figure 1. Transitional Dynamics in response to a productivity shock in the final good sector: 
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Figure 2. Transitional Dynamics in response to a productivity shock in the technology sector: 
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Figure 3. Transitional Dynamics in response to increased knowledge diffusion:
12 
































































































                                                 
12 Because the benchmark equilibrium value of 
* p and the new equilibrium differ significantly in magnitude, benchmark 
equilibrium value is not drawn in Figure 3.a) to make the dynamics visible.    42














































Figure 4. Transitional Dynamics in response to increased resource damage rate: 
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